Duncan’s Economic Blog

Deflation (again).

Posted in Uncategorized by duncanseconomicblog on March 17, 2009

Fed Chairman Bernanke made a very good speech on deflation and the steps that could be taken to prevent it back in 2002. I highly recommend reading it. It very much represents the ‘playbook’ by which the Fed is handling the crisis.

For those without the time or inclination, I’ve summarised below.

So, over to Ben:

Deflation is defined as a general decline in prices, with emphasis on the word “general.” At any given time, especially in a low-inflation economy like that of our recent experience, prices of some goods and services will be falling. Price declines in a specific sector may occur because productivity is rising and costs are falling more quickly in that sector than elsewhere or because the demand for the output of that sector is weak relative to the demand for other goods and services. Sector-specific price declines, uncomfortable as they may be for producers in that sector, are generally not a problem for the economy as a whole and do not constitute deflation. Deflation per se occurs only when price declines are so widespread that broad-based indexes of prices, such as the consumer price index, register ongoing declines.

Followed by:

The sources of deflation are not a mystery. Deflation is in almost all cases a side effect of a collapse of aggregate demand–a drop in spending so severe that producers must cut prices on an ongoing basis in order to find buyers.

Sounds rather like what we have now. The problem with deflation is that the traditional monetary policy response to a recession (cutting rates) may not work.

Deflation of sufficient magnitude may result in the nominal interest rate declining to zero or very close to zero. Once the nominal interest rate is at zero, no further downward adjustment in the rate can occur, since lenders generally will not accept a negative nominal interest rate when it is possible instead to hold cash. At this point, the nominal interest rate is said to have hit the “zero bound.”

So, as Bernanke goes on to explain unconventional policy responses are required. Starting with the central bank buying government debt (as has happened in the UK now) and moving towards the ‘ultimate weapon’.

the U.S. government has a technology, called a printing press (or, today, its electronic equivalent), that allows it to produce as many U.S. dollars as it wishes at essentially no cost. By increasing the number of U.S. dollars in circulation, or even by credibly threatening to do so, the U.S. government can also reduce the value of a dollar in terms of goods and services, which is equivalent to raising the prices in dollars of those goods and services. We conclude that, under a paper-money system, a determined government can always generate higher spending and hence positive inflation.

So, if it’s straight forward to beat deflation and generate inflation why did Japan fail to?

Japan’s economy faces some significant barriers to growth besides deflation, including massive financial problems in the banking and corporate sectors and a large overhang of government debt. Plausibly, private-sector financial problems have muted the effects of the monetary policies that have been tried in Japan, even as the heavy overhang of government debt has made Japanese policymakers more reluctant to use aggressive fiscal policies (for evidence see, for example, Posen, 1998). Fortunately, the U.S. economy does not share these problems, at least not to anything like the same degree, suggesting that anti-deflationary monetary and fiscal policies would be more potent here than they have been in Japan.

Sounding at all familiar?

Second, and more important, I believe that, when all is said and done, the failure to end deflation in Japan does not necessarily reflect any technical infeasibility of achieving that goal. Rather, it is a byproduct of a longstanding political debate about how best to address Japan’s overall economic problems. As the Japanese certainly realize, both restoring banks and corporations to solvency and implementing significant structural change are necessary for Japan’s long-run economic health. But in the short run, comprehensive economic reform will likely impose large costs on many, for example, in the form of unemployment or bankruptcy. As a natural result, politicians, economists, businesspeople, and the general public in Japan have sharply disagreed about competing proposals for reform. In the resulting political deadlock, strong policy actions are discouraged, and cooperation among policymakers is difficult to achieve.

The above paragraph is crucially important. We need strong actions now. I’d suggest two for starters. First a strong fiscal stimulus and secondly what Bernanke would term a ‘credible threat’ to cause inflation. So how about officially raising the Bank of England’s inflation target from its current level of 2% to 5%?


2 Responses

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  1. thelocalgovernmentofficer said, on March 17, 2009 at 10:49 pm

    When inflation was 5%, public sector workers were told they had to have a 2% pay rise as that was the Government’s inflation target and public sector pay in some mystic way “leads” inflation. What do you think we’ll get if inflation falls to 0% or below? 5% sounds great, should boost the economy nicely.

  2. […] has written a very good post on the subject of deflation over here, although what I found interesting was his suggestion that […]

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